Abstract-It is common nowadays for data owners to outsource their data to the cloud. Since the cloud cannot be fully trusted, the outsourced data should be encrypted. This however brings a range of problems, such as: How should a data owner grant search capabilities to the data users? How can the authorized data users search over a data owner's outsourced encrypted data? How can the data users be assured that the cloud faithfully executed the search operations on their behalf? Motivated by these questions, we propose a novel cryptographic solution, called verifiable attribute-based keyword search (VABKS). The solution allows a data user, whose credentials satisfy a data owner's access control policy, to (i) search over the data owner's outsourced encrypted data, (ii) outsource the tedious search operations to the cloud, and (iii) verify whether the cloud has faithfully executed the search operations. We formally define the security requirements of VABKS and describe a construction that satisfies them. Performance evaluation shows that the proposed schemes are practical and deployable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing allows data owners to use massive data storage and vast computation capabilities at a very low price. Despite the benefits, data outsourcing deprives data owners of direct control over their outsourced data. To alleviate concerns, data owners should encrypt their data before outsourcing to the cloud. However, encryption can hinder some useful functions such as searching over the outsourced encrypted data while enforcing an access control policy. Moreover, it is natural to outsource the search operations to the cloud, while keeping the outsourced data private. There is a need to allow the data users to verify whether the cloud faithfully executed the search operations or not. To the best of our knowledge, existing solutions cannot achieve these objectives simultaneously.
A. Our Contributions
We propose a novel cryptographic primitive, called verifiable attribute-based keyword search (VABKS). This primitive allows a data owner to control the search, and use of, its outsourced encrypted data according to an access control policy, while allowing the legitimate data users to outsource the (often costly) search operations to the cloud and verify whether or not the cloud has faithfully executed the search operations. In other words, a data user with proper credentials (corresponding to a data owner's access control policy) can (i) search over the data owner's outsourced encrypted data, (ii) outsource the search operations to the cloud, and (iii) verify whether or not the cloud has faithfully executed the search operations. We formally define the security properties of VABKS and present a scheme that provably satisfies them. The scheme is constructed in a modular fashion, by using attribute-based encryption, bloom filter, digital signature, and a new building-block we call attribute-based keyword search (ABKS) that may be of independent value. Experimental evaluation shows that the VABKS solutions are practical.
B. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, no existing solution is adequate for what we want to achieve. In what follows we briefly review the relevant techniques.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). ABE is a popular method for enforcing access control policies via cryptographic means. Basically, this technique allows entities with proper credentials to decrypt a ciphertext that was encrypted according to an access control policy [1] . Depending on how the access control policy is enforced, there are two variants: KP-ABE (key-policy ABE) where the decryption key is associated to the access control policy [2] , and CP-ABE (ciphertext-policy ABE) where the ciphertext is associated to the access control policy [3] . ABE has been enriched with various features (e.g., [4] - [7] ). In this paper, we use ABE to construct a new primitive called attribute-based keyword search (ABKS), by which keywords are encrypted according to an access control policy and data users with proper cryptographic credentials can generate tokens that can be used to search over the outsourced encrypted data. This effectively prevents a data owner from knowing the keywords a data user is searching for, while requiring no interactions between the data users and the data owners/trusted authorities. This is in contrast to [8] , where the data users interact with the data owners/trusted authorities to obtain search tokens.
Keyword Search over Encrypted Data. This technique allows a data owner to generate some tokens that can be used by a data user to search over the data owner's encrypted data. Existing solutions for keyword search over encrypted data can be classified into two categories: searchable encryption in the symmetric-key setting (e.g., [9] - [18] ) and searchable encryption in the public-key setting (e.g., [8] , [19] - [22] ). Several variants (e.g., [23] - [26] ) have been proposed to support 978-1-4799-3360-0/14/$31.00 c 2014 IEEE complex search operations. Moreover, searchable encryption in the multi-users setting has been investigated as well [12] , [27] , where the data owner can enforce an access control policy by distributing some (stateful) secret keys to the authorized users. However, all these solutions do not solve the problem we study, because (i) some of these solutions require interactions between the data users and the data owners (or a trusted proxy, such as a trapdoor generation entity [8] ) to grant search capabilities, and (ii) all these solutions (except [18] ) assume that the server faithfully executed search operations. In contrast, our solution allows a data user with proper credentials to issue search tokens by which the cloud can perform keyword search operations on behalf of the user, without requiring any interaction with the data owner. Moreover, the data user can verify whether or not the cloud has faithfully executed the keyword search operations. This is true even for the powerful technique called predicate encryption [28] , [29] , which does not offer the desired verifiability.
Verifiable Keyword Search. Recently, verifiable keyword search solutions have been proposed in [30] - [32] , where each keyword is represented as a root of some polynomial. It is possible to check whether a keyword is present by evaluating the polynomial on the keyword and verifying whether the output is zero or not. However, these approaches work only when keywords are sent in plaintext to the cloud, and are not suitable for our purpose because the cloud should not learn anything about the keywords. It is worth mentioning that the secure verifiable keyword search in the symmetric-key setting [18] can be insecure in the public-key setting because the attacker can infer keywords in question via an off-line keyword guessing attack (in lieu of the off-line dictionary attack against passwords).
Paper Organization: Section II reviews some cryptographic preliminaries. Section III defines ABKS and its security properties, presents KP-ABKS and CP-ABKS schemes and analyzes their security properties. Section IV defines VABKS and its security properties, presents the VABKS construction and analyzes its security. Section V evaluates the performance of the ABKS and VABKS schemes. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let a ← S denote selecting an element a from a set S uniformly at random, || denote the concatenation operation and string(S) denote the concatenation of elements of S ordered by their hash values. Let U = {at 1 , . . . , at n } be a set of attributes that are used to specify access control policies.
A. Cryptographic Assumption
Let p be an -bit prime, and G, G T be cyclic groups of prime order p with generators g, g T , respectively. Let e be a bilinear map:
, and (iii) e can be computed efficiently. 
B. Bloom Filter for Membership Query
A Bloom filter [33] is a data structure for succinctly representing a static set, while allowing membership queries. A m-bit Bloom filter is an array of m bits, which are all initialized as 0. It uses k independent universal hash functions H 1 , . . . , H k with the same range {0, . . . , m − 1}. For each element w ∈ S = {w 1 , . . . , w n }, the bits corresponding to H j (w) are set to 1, where 1 ≤ j ≤ k. To determine whether w belongs to S or not, once can check whether all of the bits corresponding to H j (w) equal to 1, where
If not, it is certain that w ∈ S; otherwise, w ∈ S with a high probability (i.e., there is a non-zero falsepositive rate). Suppose the hash functions are perfectly random and n elements are hashed into a m-bit Bloom filter, the false-positive rate is 
C. Access Trees for Representing Access Control Policies
Access trees can represent access control policies [2] . In an access tree, a leaf is associated with an attribute and an inner node represents a threshold gate. Let num v be the number of children of node v, and label the children from the left to the right as 1, . . . , num v . Let k v , 1 ≤ k v ≤ num v , be the threshold value associated with node v, where k v = 1 represents the OR gate and k v = num v represents the AND gate. Let parent(v) denote the parent of node v, ind(v) denote the label of node v, att(v) denote the attribute associated to leaf node v, lvs(T) denote the set of leaves of access tree T, and T v denote the subtree of T rooted at node v (e.g., T root = T).
Let F (Atts, T v ) = 1 indicate that an attribute set Atts satisfies the access control policy represented by subtree T v , where F (Atts, T v ) can be evaluated iteratively as follows: 
Given an access tree T, we denote the algorithm for distributing a secret s according to T by:
This algorithm generates a polynomial q v of degree k v − 1 for each node v in a top-down fashion (for each leaf node k v = 1):
• If v is the root of T (i.e., v = root), set q v (0) = s and randomly
• If v is an inner node (but not the root), set q v (0) = q parent(v) (ind(v)) and randomly select k v − 1 coefficients for polynomial q v . When the algorithm halts, each leaf v is associated with a value q v (0), which is the secret share of s at node v.
Given an access tree T and a set of values {E u1 , . . ., E um }, where u 1 , . . ., u m are the leaves of T,
e is a bilinear map, and q u1 (0), . . . , q um (0) are secret shares of s according to T, the algorithm for reconstructing e (g, h) s is denoted by
This algorithm executes the following steps with respect to node v in a bottom-top fashion according to T:
When the algorithm halts, the root of T is associated with
III. ATTRIBUTE-BASED KEYWORD SEARCH (ABKS)
This new primitive allows a data owner to specify a policy for controlling the keyword search operations over its outsoured encrypted data. That is, a data user who possesses attributes that satisfy the data owner's policy can conduct keyword search over the oursourced encrypted data. This primitive naturally has two variants: KP-ABKS (key-policy ABKS) where the cryptographic credentials are associated to the access control policy, and CP-ABKS (ciphertext-policy ABKS) where the ciphertext is associated to the access control policy. To unify the presentation, let I Enc denote the input to encryption function Enc and I KeyGen denote the input to key generation function KeyGen. For CP-ABKS, I Enc and I KeyGen are respectively the access tree and the attribute set; for KP-ABKS, I Enc and I KeyGen are respectively the attribute set and the access tree. Let F (I KeyGen , I Enc ) = 1 denote I KeyGen satisfies I Enc in CP-ABKS and I Enc satisfies I KeyGen in KP-ABKS.
A. Definition and Security
The model of ABKS is: A data owner outsources its encrypted keywords to the cloud, a data user generates search tokens according to some keywords, and the cloud, who receives search tokens from the user, conducts the search operations over outsourced encrypted keywords.
Definition 1: ABKS consists of the following algorithms:
This algorithm initializes the public parameter pm and generates a master key mk.
• sk ← KeyGen(mk, I KeyGen ): This algorithm outputs credential sk for a user according to I KeyGen .
• cph ← Enc(w, I Enc ): This algorithm encrypts keyword w to obtain ciphertext cph.
• tk ← TokenGen(sk, w): This algorithm allows a data user to generate a search token tk according to its credential sk and keyword w.
F (I KeyGen , I Enc ) = 1 and (ii) ciphertext cph and token tk correspond to the same keyword , and return 0 otherwise.
An ABKS scheme is correct if the following holds: Given (mk, pm) ← Setup(1 ), sk ← KeyGen(mk, I KeyGen ) and F (I KeyGen , I Enc ) = 1, cph ← Enc(w, I Enc ) and tk ← TokenGen(sk, w), Search(cph, tk) always returns 1.
The adversary model against ABKS is the following: data owners and authorized data users are trusted, but the cloud is trusted but curious (i.e., executing the protocol honestly but attempting to infer private information as well). Intuitively, security means that the cloud learn nothing beyond the search results. Specifically, given a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A (modeling the cloud), an ABKS scheme is secure if the following holds (formal definition can be found in the full version of the present paper [34] ):
• Selective security against chosen-keyword attack: Without being given any matching search token, A cannot infer any information about the plaintext keyword of a keyword ciphertext in the selective security model, where A must determine I Enc it intends to attack before the system is boostrapped [35] .
• Keyword secrecy: In the public-key setting, it is impossible to protect the search tokens (aka. predicate privacy [36] ) against the keyword guessing attack. This is because A can encrypt a keyword of its choice and check whether the resulting keyword ciphertext and the target token correspond to the same keyword, which is caused by the use of "deterministic encryption." Therefore, we use a weaker security notion called keyword secrecy, assuring that the probability A learning the keyword from the keyword ciphertext and search tokens is negligibly more than the probability of correct random keyword guess.
B. Construction
The basic idea underlying the construction is the following: each keyword ciphertext and each search token has two parts, one is associated to the keyword and the other is associated to the attributes (or access control policy). If the attributes satisfy the access control policy, one can determine whether the search token and keyword ciphertext correspond to the same keyword or not. Consider KP-ABKS as an example. Let
* → G be a hash function modeled as random oracle and H 2 : {0, 1} * → Z p be an one-way hash function. A data user's credentials are generated by letting t ← Z p ,
where g is a generator of G, q v (0) is the share of secret ac for leaf v according to access tree T. The keyword ciphertext and search token are generated as follows:
• Keyword w is encrypted into two parts: one is to "blend" w with randomness
c ∈ G are public keys, and the other is associated to attribute set Atts by letting
r2 for each at j ∈ Atts. The two parts are tied together via r 2 .
• Given a set of credentials, a search token for keyword w is generated with two parts: one is associated to w as tok 1 = (g a g bH2(w) ) s and tok 2 = g cs for some s ← Z p , and the other is associated to the credentials by letting 
KeyGen(mk, T): Execute Share(T, ac) to obtain secret share q v (0) of ac for each leave v ∈ lvs(T) on access tree T. For each leaf v ∈ lvs(T), pick t ← Z p , and compute
Enc(w, Atts): Select r 1 , r 2 ← Z p , and compute
TokenGen(sk, w): Select s ← Z p , and compute
Search(tk, cph): Given attribute set Atts specified in cph, select an attribute set S satisfying the access tree T specified in tk. If S does not exist, return 0; otherwise, for each tok 2 ) , and 0 otherwise.
The scheme is correct because
The scheme is secure because of the following theorems, whose proofs are given in the full version of the paper [34] .
Theorem 1: Given the DL assumption and one-way hash function H 2 , the KP-ABKS scheme is selectively secure against chosen-keyword attack in the random oracle model.
Theorem 2:
Given the one-way hash function H 2 , the KP-ABKS scheme achieves keyword secrecy in the random oracle model.
2) CP-ABKS Construction and Security Analysis:
Let be the primary security parameter. It consists of the following algorithms.
Setup (1 ): Select a bilinear group e : G × G → G T , where G and G T are cyclic groups of order p, which is an -bit prime. Let H 1 : {0, 1}
* → G be a hash function modeled as random oracle and H 2 : {0, 1} * → Z p be an one-way hash function, select a, b, c ← Z p and g ← G, and set
Enc(w, T): Select r 1 , r 2 ← Z p , and compute
Search(tk, cph): Given attribute set Atts as specified in tk, select an attribute set S that satisfies the access tree T specified in cph. If S does not exist, return 0; otherwise, Correctness of the scheme can be verified similarly to that of KP-ABKS. Security of the scheme is assured by the following theorems, whose proofs are given in the full version [34] .
Theorem 3: Given the one-way hash function H 2 , the CP-ABKS scheme is selectively secure against chosen-keyword attack in the generic bilinear group model [37] .
Theorem 4: Given the one-way hash function H 2 , the CP-ABKS scheme achieves keyword secrecy in the random oracle model.
IV. VERIFIABLE ATTRIBUTE-BASED KEYWORD SEARCH
In the model of ABKS, the party (e.g., cloud) is assumed to execute the search operation faithfully (despite that the party may attempt to infer useful information about the keywords). VABKS achieves the goal of ABKS despite that the party executing the search operation may be malicious.
A. Model
We consider the system model illustrated in Figure 1 , which involves four parties: a data owner, who outsources its encrypted data as well as encrypted keyword-index to the cloud; a cloud, which provides storage services and can conduct keyword search operations on behalf of the data users; a data user, who is to retrieve the data owner's encrypted data according to some keyword (i.e., keyword search); a trusted authority, which issues credentials to the data owners/users. The credentials are sent over authenticated private channels (which can be achieved through another layer of mechanisms). The data owners are naturally trusted. Both authorized and unauthorized data users are semi-trusted, meaning that they may try to infer some sensitive information of interest. The cloud is not trusted as it may manipulate the search operations, which already implies that the cloud may manipulate the outsourced encrypted data.
B. Definition
Let FS = {F 1 , . . . , F n } be a set of data files. Let KG j , 1 ≤ j ≤ l, be a set of keywords (also called "keyword group") that are encrypted with the same access control policy (i.e., access tree). Let KG = {KG 1 , . . . , KG l }. For each keyword w, let MP(w) be the set of identifiers identifying data files that contain keyword w. A VABKS scheme is correct if the following holds:
, tk ← TokenGen(sk, w) and (proof, rslt) ← SearchIndex(Au, Index, D cph , tk), Verify(sk, w, tk, rslt, proof) always returns 1.
Informally, security of VABKS is defined as the following four requirements, where the cloud is the adversary A (formal definitions are given in the full version [34] ).
• Data secrecy: Given encrypted keywords and search tokens, A still cannot learn any information (in a computational sense) about the encrypted data files. This definition can be formalized by the chosen-plaintext security game, where two challenges • Verifiability: If A returns an incorrect search result, it can be detected by the user with an overwhelming probability.
C. Construction
A trivial solution for achieving verifiability is that a data user downloads the keyword ciphertexts and conduct the search operations locally. This solution incurs prohibitive communication and computational overhead. As highlighted in Figure 2 , we instead let a data user outsource the keyword search operation to the cloud, and then verify that the cloud faithfully performed the keyword search operation. More specifically, the data owner uses the signatures and bloom filters as follows:
• A keyword signature is generated for each keyword ciphertext and its associated data ciphertexts. It is used for preventing the cloud from returning incorrect data ciphertexts as the search result.
• For each keyword group, one bloom filter is built from its keywords. This allows a data user to check that the searched keyword was indeed not in the keyword group when the cloud returns a null search result, without downloading all keyword ciphertexts from the cloud. A random number is selected and encrypted with the same access control policy as keywords. The random number masks the bloom filter for preserving keyword privacy. A bloom filter signature is generated for the masked bloom filter and the random number ciphertext for assuring their integrity.
• A global signature is obtained by signing random number ciphertexts of all groups. It allows a data user to verify the integrity of the random number ciphertexts.
• A local signature is generated for all keyword ciphertexts within the same keyword group KG j . This signature allows the user to validate the integrity of keyword ciphertexts within the keyword group. Figure 3 describes the VABKS scheme, which uses a signature scheme Sig = (KeyGen, Sign, Verify), a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec), an ABE scheme ABE = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec), where the latter two encryption schemes are used to encrypt data files. The VABKS scheme is built on top of an ABKS scheme ABKS = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, TokenGen, Search), which encrypts the keywords. Note that ABE and ABKS can be their ciphertextpolicy variant or their key-policy variant, but for the same type. This leads to two variants of VABKS.
Note that in the Verify algorithm of Figure 3 , when an authorized data user verifies a null search result for keyword group {cph w |w ∈ KG i }, where the user searches keyword w , it can happen that 1 ← BFVerify({H 1 , . . . , H k }, BF i , w ) due to the false-positive of the Bloom filter. To validate the search result in this case, the Verify algorithm has to download {cph w |w ∈ KG i }, and checks the keyword ciphertexts one by one. We stress that this does not incur significant communication cost on average because we can set the false-positive rate as low as possible by choosing appropriate m and k (i.e., upon one search request, the "wasted" bandwidth communication and computational cost are proportional to this false-positive rate). For example, in our experiment we set the false-positive rate to be 4.5 × 10 −9 .
D. Security Analysis
Security of the VABKS scheme can be proven as the following theorems, whose proofs are deferred to the full version [34] .
Theorem 5: If ABE and SE are secure against the chosenplaintext attack, the VABKS scheme achieves the data secrecy.
Theorem 6: If ABE is secure against chosen-plaintext attack, H is a secure pseudorandom generator and ABKS is selectively secure against chosen keyword attack, the VABKS scheme is selectively secure against chosen-keyword attack.
Theorem 7: If ABE is secure against chosen-plaintext attack, H is a secure pseudorandom generator and ABKS achieves keyword secrecy, the VABKS scheme achieves keyword secrecy.
Theorem 8: If Sig is a secure signature, the VABKS construction achieves the verifiability.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the efficiency of the ABKS schemes in terms of both asymptotic complexity and actual execution time, Given security parameter , the attribute authority chooses k universal hash functions H 1 , . . . , H k , which are used to construct a m-bit Bloom filter. Let H : {0, 1} → {0, 1} m be a secure pseudorandom generator, SE be a secure symmetric encryption scheme, ABE be a secure ABE scheme and ABKS be a secure ABKS scheme. This algorithm executes (ABE.pm, ABE.mk) ← ABE.Setup(1 ) and (ABKS.pm, ABKS.mk) ← ABKS.Setup(1 ). It sets the public parameter as pm = (ABE.pm, ABKS.pm, H 1 , . . . , H k ) and mk = (ABE.mk, ABKS.mk). KeyGen(mk, I KeyGen ): The attribute authority runs ABE.sk ← ABE.KeyGen(ABE.mk, I KeyGen ) and ABKS.sk ← ABKS.KeyGen(ABKS.mk, I KeyGen ), sets sk = (ABE.sk, ABKS.sk), and sends sk to a data owner/user over an authenticated private channel.
The data owner runs (Sig.sk, Sig.pk) ← Sig.KeyGen(1 ), keeps Sig.sk private and makes Sig.pk public. Given 
TokenGen(sk, w): Given credentials sk, a data user generates search token tk ← ABKS.TokenGen(ABKS.sk, w). SearchIndex(Au, Index, D cph , tk): Let rslt be an empty set and proof = (σ) initially. The cloud enumerates i = {cph w |w ∈ KG i }, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, which are the keyword ciphertexts with respect to the same access control policy.
• For each cph w ∈ i , it runs γ ← ABKS.Search(cph w , tk). If γ = 0, it continues to process the next keyword ciphertext in i ; otherwise, it adds the tuple (cph w , {cph Fj |ID cph Fj ∈ MP(cph w )}) to rslt and (σ w , cph BFi ) to proof.
• If there exist no γ = 1 after processing all cph w in i , then its adds (BF i , cph BFi , σ BFi ) to proof.
Verify(sk, w, tk, proof, rslt): The data user verifies the search result from the cloud as follows: 1) Verify the integrity of the random number ciphertexts: Let γ = Sig.Verify(Sig.pk, σ, cph BF1 || . . . ||cph BF l ). If γ = 0, then return 0; otherwise, continue to execute the following. 2) For i = 1, . . . , l, it executes as follows to verify that the cloud indeed returned the correct result for each keyword group i: Case 1: If (cph w , {cph Fj |ID cph Fj ∈ MP(cph w )}) ∈ rslt, meaning there exists the keyword ciphertext cph w , which corresponds to the same access control policy as what is specified by cph BFi , having the same keyword specified by tk, then it runs γ ← ABKS.Search(cph w , tk) and γ ← Sig.Verify(Sig.pk, σ w , cph w ||string({cph Fj |ID cph F j ∈ MP(cph w )})) to verify whether or not cph w matches tk and all the associated data ciphertexts are returned by the cloud. If either γ = 0 or γ = 0, then return 0, otherwise, continue to i = i + 1. Case 2: If (BF i , cph BFi , σ BFi ) ∈ proof meaning that there is no matching keyword ciphertext, then it continues to verify the integrity of the masked Bloom filter by running γ ← Sig.Verify(Sig.pk, σ BFi , BF i ||cph BFi ). If γ = 0, return 0; otherwise, execute the following:
• If the data user is authorized, compute M ← ABE.Dec(ABE.sk, cph BFi ),
to check whether w or not is present in the keyword group as represented by BF i .
-If δ = 0, meaning that w is not present in the keyword group as represented by BF i , then continue to i = i + 1.
-If δ = 1, download i = {cph w |w ∈ KG i } and σ i from the cloud, and run η ← Sig.Verify(Sig.pk, σ i , string({cph w |w ∈ KG i })). If η = 0, return 0; otherwise, run τ ← ABKS.Search(cph w , tk) by enumerating cph w in cph w |w ∈ KG i }. If there exists some τ = 1 after processing all cph w (meaning that there exists some cph w that matches tk), return 0; otherwise, continue to i = i + 1.
• If the data user is unauthorized, then it continues to i = i + 1 because cph BFi cannot be decrypted. and the efficiency of the VABKS scheme in terms of actual execution time. We do not consider the asymptotic complexity of VABKS because it uses multiple building-blocks (e.g., signing and ABE schemes) that can be instantiated with any secure solutions. Asymptotic complexity is measured in terms of four kinds of operations: H 1 denotes the operation of mapping a bit-string to an element of G, Pair denotes the pairing operation, E denotes the exponentiation operation in G, and E T denotes the exponentiation operation in G T . We ignore multiplication and hash operations (other than H 1 ) because they are much more efficient than the above operations [38] .
We implemented ABKS and VABKS in JAVA, while using the Java Pairing Based Cryptography library (jPBC) [38] . In our implementation, the bilinear map is instantiated as Type A pairing ( = 512), which offers a level of security equivalent to 1024-bit DLOG [38] . For both CP-VABKS and KP-VABKS, we instantiated the symmetric encryption scheme as AES-CBC, and the signature scheme with DSA provided by JDK1.6. We instantiated ABKS, ABE as CP-ABKS, CP-ABE [3] for CP-ABKS, and KP-ABKS, KP-ABE [2] for KP-VABKS, respectively. Finally, we set the example access control policy as "at 1 AND . . . AND at N ."
A. Efficiency of ABKS
Asymptotic Complexity of the ABKS Schemes. Table I describes the asymptotic complexities of the ABKS schemes. We observe that in the CP-ABKS scheme, the complexity of KeyGen is almost the same as that of Enc. In the KP-ABKS scheme, KeyGen is more expensive than Enc. In both schemes, the two Search algorithms incur almost the same cost. complexity output size Actual Performance of the ABKS Schemes. To evaluate the performance of the ABKS schemes, we ran the experiments on a client machine with Linux OS, 2.93GHz Intel Core Duo CPU (E7500), and 2GB RAM. We varied N , the number of attributes that are involved in the example access control policy, from 1 to 50 with step length 10. We ran each experiment for 10 times to obtain the average execution time. Table II shows the execution time of the two ABKS schemes. We observe that for both schemes, the keyword encryption algorithm Enc (run by the data owner) is more expensive than that of the keyword search algorithm Search (run by the cloud) with the same N . However, the keyword encryption algorithm is executed only once for each keyword, whereas the keyword search algorithm will be performed as many times as needed. Furthermore, we advocate that the data users outsource the keyword search operations to the cloud (i.e., taking advantage of the cloud's computational resources).
B. Efficiency of VABKS with Real Data
To demonstrate the feasibility of VABKS in practice, we evaluated it with real data, which consists of 2,019 distinct keywords extracted from 670 PDF documents (papers) from the ACM Digital Library with a total size of 778.1MB. We set k = 28 and m = 10KB for Bloom filter so that ≈ 40 and the false-positive rate is around 4.5 × 10 −9 . We vary the access control policy ranging from 1 to 50 attributes with step-length 10. In each experiment, we encrypted all keywords with the same access control policy. The algorithms run by the data owner and the data users (i.e. BuildIndex, TokenGen and Verify) were executed on a client machine with Linux OS, 2.93GHz Intel Core Duo CPU (E7500), and 2GB RAM. The algorithm run by the cloud (i.e., SearchIndex) was executed on a server machine (a laptop) with Windows 7, Intel i5 2.60GHz CPU, and 8GB RAM. Figure 4 (a) shows the execution time of BuildIndex that was run by the data owner. We observe that with the same attribute/policy complexity, CP-VABKS is more costly than that of KP-VABKS when running algorithm BuildIndex. Figure  4 (b) plots the execution time of the algorithms run by the data user and the cloud. We simulated that algorithm SearchIndex needs to conduct search operations over 1,010 keyword ciphertexts to find the matched keyword ciphertext. We observe that the execution time of TokenGen and Verify is really small compared with keyword search algorithm SearchIndex. This again confirms that the data user should outsource keyword search operations to the cloud. Figure 4 (c) plots the size of index and auxiliary information, including 2,019 keyword ciphertexts, bloom filters and signatures. We also see that CP-VABKS consumes around two times more storage space than KP-VABKS with the same attribute/policy complexity. These discrepancies should serve as a factor when deciding whether to use CP-VABKS or KP-VABKS in practice.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a novel cryptographic primitive called verifiable attribute-based keyword search for secure cloud computing over outsourced encrypted data. This primitive allows a data owner to control the search of its outsourced encrypted data according to an access control policy, while the authorized data users can outsource the search operations to the cloud and force the cloud to faithfully execute the search (as a cheating cloud can be held accountable). Performance evaluation shows that the new primitive is practical. Our study focused on static data. As such, one interesting open problem for future research is to accommodate dynamic data.
